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Institutional Resilience in a Changing
World Economy? The Case of the
German Banking and Chemical
Industries
Michael Muller
Abstract
This paper examines whether there has been a transformation towards
company-specific and unitarist industrial relations in Germany. On the basis
of 25 case studies of employment practices in German and foreign-owned
banks and chemical firms as well as industry data, the research found that the
German system has so far remained relatively stable. Companies in the two
industries studied generally still comply with the labour market institutions of
multi-employer collective bargaining, workplace representation and initial
vocational training. Pressures have been accommodated by changes within
the system rather than by a radical change of the system.
1. Introduction
More than a decade ago, Kochan et al. (1986) published their seminal book,
The Transformation of American Industrial Relations, in which they
described the demise of trade unions and collective bargaining and the
emergence of a large non-union sector in the United States. Since then
similar transformations have been observed in other countries. There has
been a search for greater flexibility in the deployment of labour which has
partly been achieved by a decentralization of industrial relations. In the
process, trade unions have often been marginalized, and there has been a
shift from pluralist towards more unitarist industrial relations (Clarke and
Bamber 1994; Ferner and Hyman 1992; Locke et al. 1995; Ruysseveldt and
Visser 1996). As early as the 1950s, a worldwide convergence of managerial
practices towards those of the USA was predicted. However, whereas Kerr
et al.’s (1960) convergence thesis saw technology as the driving force behind
convergence, today’s transformation of industrial relations and human
resource practices seems to be driven more by competition.
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The case of Germany is of particular interest when examining whether
there is a convergence towards unitarist industrial relations practices. Its
‘institutionally strong’ system (Marginson et al. 1993) exerts pressures that
could prevent such a transformation. German business is embedded in a
system of social institutions (Lane 1992) which legally impose a uniform set
of arrangements on companies and/or provide incentives for employers to
accept institutional constraints. In this system change is achieved by
negotiation rather than by a unitary imposition of managerial decisions.
Since the early 1990s, it has been disputed whether the German model can
survive in times of increased competitive pressures. The government,
employers, the media, academics and foreign observers have questioned the
viability of the German model and have suggested that it must be changed.
The state has been accused of excess subsidization of ageing industries and
of the imposition of too high a tax burden (Smyser 1993). The strong links
between banks and industry and the German system of corporate govern-
ance as a whole has been criticized (Dunsch 1994). As big German
corporations are becoming increasingly dependent on international capital
markets, they are under more pressure to comply with Anglo-American
financial rules (Goodhart 1994: 52–3). A particular target of demands for
change has been centralized collective bargaining. Long before the recent
debate about the competitiveness of the German economy, neoclassical
German economists put forward the view that the centralized collective
bargaining system sets a high minimum wage and restricts flexibility. They
pointed out that this is a particular problem for low performing firms,
branches or regions as well as for unskilled workers and the unemployed
(Hiemenz 1992; Walter 1988). These arguments have been taken up by
employers and politicians. (For a critical review of this debate, see Hassel
and Schulten 1997.)
Considering the worldwide transformation of employment practices
along US lines and the apparent popularity of the US free market model
among German economists, employers and politicians, there are likely to be
increasing pressures on the three key labour market institutions of
centralized collective bargaining, workplace representation and initial
vocational training. One could expect that firms operating in Germany
would not any more comply with their requirements, as they severely restrict
organizational autonomy. This means that companies will avoid collective
bargaining; if this is not feasible, they will prefer company level bargaining.
Works councils will also be avoided, as they have strong co-determination
rights. There will be no compliance with the system of initial vocational
training, as it is regulated by a tripartite system that includes the government
and trade unions, reduces organizational autonomy and provides general
rather than specific skills.
The data reported here are part of a larger study of industrial relations and
human resource management in Germany. Case studies of 25 banks and
chemical firms as well as the two industries were conducted. This examined
not only the case study firm’s compliance with German labour market
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institutions, but also certain human resource practices such as selection,
appraisal and communication. All but one of the sample firms have a
worldwide work-force of at least 1000 employees. The exceptional case,
Savings Bank, is closely integrated in the savings bank group (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
Firms in the Sample and the Approximate Number of their German Work-force, 1993
German companies US subsidiaries UK subsidiaries
Big Bank 60,000 US Branch Bank 4,000 UK Merchant Bank 1,000
Universal Bank 40,000 US Merchant Bank 300
Regional Bank 15,000 US International Bank 200
State Bank 5,000 US Investment Bank 100
Cooperative Bank 2,000 US Commercial Bank 100
Savings Bank 500
Big Chemical 90,000 US Consumer Chemicals 9,000 UK Oil 4,000
Consumer Chemicals 20,000 US Chemical 3,000 UK Chemical 2,000
Big Pharmaceutical 10,000 US Oil 2,000 UK Pharmaceutical 1,500
Applied Chemicals 5,000 US Pharmaceutical 500
Oil Company 5,000
Pharmaceutical Firm 1,500
Besides German-owned firms, UK and US companies operating in
Germany comprise part of the sample. Foreign-owned firms were included
as they are often more likely than indigenous firms to challenge national
labour market institutions (Ferner 1994); therefore, their example should
help to illuminate the pressures on the German system. This particularly
applies to US multinationals, as they are renowned for deviating from
national industrial relations and human resource practices (Chi-Ching and
Keng-Choo 1995; Wever 1995).
The second aspect on which the firms in the sample deliberately differ is
industry. The sample includes banks and chemical firms. One consideration
that informed the choice of industry was that both consist of many US- and
UK-owned firms. Another was that both industries differ in their exposure
to international competition. The German chemical industry is a global
industry with an export ratio of 54 per cent in 1994; in contrast, banking is a
multi-domestic industry.
A third reason for examining banks and chemical firms is trade union
organization. The chemical industry is dominated by the IG Chemie, an
industrial union affiliated to the German Trade Union Federation (DGB).
This union has organized about 45 per cent of all employees in the industry.
Thus, union density in the chemical industry is higher than in Germany as a
whole, where it is less than 40 per cent. The dominance of this trade union is
also reflected by the fact that about 85 per cent of all works councillors in the
chemical industry are members of the IG Chemie (Mu¨ller-Jentsch 1995: 63).
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Differing from more radical DGB affiliated unions, such as HBV and IG
Metall, the IG Chemie is a non-radical trade union (Markovits 1986). The
relation between the IG Chemie and the employers’ association of the
chemical industry is described by both sides as one of ‘social partnership’
(Sozialpartnerschaft) (Ka¨dtler and Hertle 1997). There is an extensive
system of mutual information and consultation. Since 1971, there has been
no strike action in the chemical industry. Today a compulsory arbitration
procedure, agreed to by the collective bargaining parties in 1975, makes
strike action in this industry very unlikely (Schlemmer 1988: 321). In
contrast to chemicals and most other German industries, the banking sector
is not dominated by a DGB affiliated union. There is strong competition
between the DGB affiliated service-sector union HBV and the independent
white-collar union DAG (Mu¨ller-Jentsch et al. 1995). Each of these unions
represents only 10 per cent of the work-force. The relatively weak position
of banking unions is also reflected in a significant number of works
councillors not being organized in a trade union. Traditionally, there were
hardly any strikes in German banks. This changed in the early 1990s when
there were two major strikes. However, these showed that the combination
of low density and union rivalry makes it difficult for banking unions to
organize effective strike action.
A similarity between the banking and chemical industries is that
employers are highly organized: 95 per cent of firms in these industries are
full members of an employers’ association. Although in theory they only
have to guarantee union members the minimum terms and conditions of the
collective bargaining agreement, in practice collective bargaining agree-
ments in Germany generally apply for non-union members as well.
Furthermore, as the non-organized employers are usually small or medium-
sized firms, collective bargaining coverage in the two industries studied is
more than 95 per cent. This is above the average for German industry as a
whole which is about 90 per cent. The two industries studied offer a
particularly stark contrast to the metal industry which features prominently
in studies about German industrial relations. In the metal industry, the
coverage of collective bargaining was traditionally less encompassing than in
banks and in the chemical industry. Furthermore, over the last decade the
percentage of metal employees covered fell from 74.4 per cent in 1984 to
66.3 per cent in 1994 (Schroeder and Ruppert 1996). A particular problem of
multi-employer collective bargaining in the metal industry is its breadth, as it
covers among other things shipyards, electronic manufacturers, car pro-
ducers and computer firms. This makes it more difficult to find tailored
solutions than in the more homogeneous banking and chemical industries.
Regarding the third German labour market institution discussed in this
paper, initial vocational training, the training record of chemical firms is
similar to the one of German industry. In contrast, over the last decade
banks have had a significantly higher percentage of apprentices in their
work-force. A further difference from chemical companies and manufactur-
ing companies in general, which usually train apprentices in several
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occupations, is that banks normally offer only an initial vocational training
for ‘bank clerks’ (Muller 1996).
For the data collection, multiple sources of evidence were used. Most
important were visits to each sample firm. In each organization the
researcher interviewed at least one senior personnel manager and where
possible a works councillor. Between autumn 1991 and autumn 1994, 97
face-to-face interviews, usually lasting between one and one and a half
hours, were conducted. In addition, the researcher carried out 56 telephone
interviews with the contact persons in the companies during the final stages
of the research process to clarify any ambiguous responses. Given the
objective and the aims of the study, an open, semi-structured interview style
was used. Primary evidence in the form of company newsletters, works
agreements and appraisal forms was a second source of information. A third
one was secondary published data such as annual reports. The collection of
information from different sources made it possible to validate the claims of
the respondents (triangulation). For this purpose, I also interviewed 16
experts from consultancies, employers’ associations, trade unions and other
organizations. For each of the sample firms a case study was written. The
reports were fed back to the key informants in each firm. The respondent
validation helped to determine if the understanding of particular company
facts and situations was correct.
The compliance of the sample firms and the future of the three main
German labour market institutions will now be examined. Section 2
analyses collective bargaining, Section 3 workplace representation and
Section 4 initial vocational training.
2. Multi-employer collective bargaining
Multi-employer bargaining in Germany not only regulates wages but also
defines terms and conditions such as weekly working hours, vacation days
and overtime pay. (For a more detailed description, see Incomes Data
Services 1996; Visser and Ruysseveldt 1996.) Two-thirds of the sample firms
comply with the requirements of centralized collective bargaining. They are
full members of an employers’ association1 and guarantee their work-forces
the minimum terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is important to note that this is not representative for the two industries
studied. In banking as well as in the chemical industry, about 95 per cent of
firms are organized.
The Avoidance of Centralized Collective Bargaining
Three of the sample firms—Pharmaceutical Firm, US Oil and UK Oil—only
partly comply with the requirements of the German system of centralized
collective bargaining. They have a company agreement with the chemical
union IG Chemie. These companies left the employers’ association of the
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chemical industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s, long before the current
discussion about the viability of multi-employer bargaining. In contrast to
US Oil and UK Oil, Pharmaceutical Firm negotiates only a remuneration
agreement but entirely accepts the general framework agreement of the
chemical industry. Although the salary level of the company agreement is
lower compared with the industry agreement, job enhancements and
bonuses included, Pharmaceutical Firm effectively pays more than the
collective bargaining agreement foresees. The wage level and the terms and
conditions set by US Oil’s and UK Oil’s company agreements are more
favourable than those of the collective bargaining agreement of the chemical
industry. From a management point of view, the advantages of company
bargaining such as the inclusion of performance-related bonuses do not
necessarily outweigh the costs of local bargaining. Among these are conflicts
that are externalized by collective bargaining at the industry level. A senior
human resource manager of US Oil reported that the works councillors in
the negotiating commission sometimes reduce their demands only in return
for concessions in works agreements. This explains why US Oil’s manage-
ment has considered rejoining the employers’ association.
Five of the firms in the sample—US Merchant Bank, US International
Bank, US Investment Bank, US Commercial Bank and US Chemical—are
neither full members of an employers’ association nor do they have a
company agreement. The human resource managers of these firms claimed
that they stay outside the employers’ association in order to be flexible.
‘Flexibility’ for them means that merit increases can be below the increase
negotiated for the industry and that they can use the performance-related
reward systems of their parent company. In 1993 and 1994, US Chemical
was able to decide to pay no merit increases at all, although tariff wages in
the chemical industry increased. Besides pay, human resource managers of
four of these firms also suggested that they want to be able to fix terms and
conditions differently. However, in practice they comply with most terms
and conditions set by the umbrella agreements of their industry. A major
exception is working hours. At the end of 1993, US Chemical, US
International Bank and US Investment Bank had a regular working week
longer than that specified by the collective bargaining agreement of their
industry.
None of the non-collective bargaining firms in the sample is cited in the
academic literature or in the business press as an example of successful
avoidance of centralized collective bargaining. A reason for this may be the
limitations of a bargaining avoidance strategy. In addition to labour market
pressures that make it difficult to undercut the terms and conditions that are
standards in the industry, these limitations are the co-determination rights
of works councils, the level of pay, and trade union pressure. First, the
case of US Chemical shows that even a non-collective bargaining firm is not
free to introduce its worldwide remuneration system in Germany because it
needs the approval of its works council. In late 1993, management had been
able to introduce the new system only in the headquarters, which has no
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works council, and in two of the three plants. The works council of US
Chemical’s third German plant was still rejecting attempts by management
to introduce the new system. It is interesting to note that US Chemical’s
human resource director suggested that most conflicts with the works
council are about compensation and salary administration. In contrast,
managers and work councillors in centralized collective bargaining firms
mentioned working hours as the most critical point.
Second, one of the main criticisms of the German system of centralized
bargaining is that it leads to high wages. The five non-collective bargaining
firms in the sample pay higher wages than those set by industry-wide
collective bargaining. In turn they have greater financial flexibility. Third,
large companies that have no collective bargaining at all might come under
pressure from trade unions to negotiate a deal. For example, in 1993 the
Digital Equipment’s German subsidiary was forced by a strike to accept a
company agreement with the IG Metall. This could explain why with the
exception of US Chemical all non-collective bargaining firms in the sample
are relatively small.
The Future of the System of Centralized Collective Bargaining in Chemicals
and Banking
From the evidence presented so far, it seems that even for large firms it
would be possible to switch from multi-employer to company-level bargain-
ing. Nevertheless, none of those sample firms that were members of an
employers’ association was considering leaving their association. We also
found no press accounts reporting such a move for any other firm in these
industries. Nor did we come across reports about organized firms having
negotiated concession agreements at the plant level that are unlawful, by
lowering terms and conditions below the minimum level of the collective
bargaining agreement. The percentage of employees working in commercial
banks covered by industry-wide collective bargaining actually increased,
from 92 per cent in 1980 to 97 per cent in 1995 (Arbeitgeberverband des
privaten Bankgewerbes 1996: 37; own calculations). Although the evidence
is clearly limited, in both industries the system of multi-employer bargaining
does not seem to be threatened. This is a somewhat surprising result
considering the current debate in Germany about the viability of centralized
collective bargaining. However, this is mainly restricted to East Germany
and the metal industry (Ettl and Heikenroth 1996; Hassel and Schulten
1997; Schroeder and Ruppert 1996).
Nevertheless, the chemical and banking trade unions have had to pay a
price for the relative stability of multi-employer bargaining in their
industries. First, in both industries employers have gained significant
flexibility concessions in recent years. In the banking industry it has been
agreed that weekly working hours are only an average which has to be
achieved in a three-month period. Since 1996, with the explicit aim of saving
jobs, it has become possible for management and works council to reduce
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weekly working hours from 39 to 31 without pay compensation. In the
chemical industry this ‘regulated decentralization’ of collective bargaining
(Hassel and Schulten 1997) went even further. When working hours in the
chemical industry were reduced to 37.5 per week in 1992, it was agreed that
this is an average that has to be achieved in a 12-month period. In four of the
nine chemical firms covered by collective bargaining, a significant part of the
reduction of working hours was accomplished by an increase in annual
leave. For example, in 1993 regular working hours per week were still 38.5 at
UK Pharmaceutical and 40 at the UK Chemical plant surveyed. These
examples show that firms that are covered by centralized collective
bargaining can achieve a flexibility similar to that of a non-collective
bargaining firm like US Chemical. Since 1994, chemical employers have
gained even more far-reaching flexibility concessions. Most of these were
unique and have had a pilot function for German industry. With the consent
of the collective bargaining parties, weekly working hours can be fixed at
between 35 and 40 hours. Chemical companies have also been allowed to
recruit long-term unemployed and those finishing initial vocational training
for less than the normal salary. Firms facing serious economic problems
have the opportunity to reduce or scrap entirely the collectively agreed
annual bonus if the works council and the collective bargaining parties
agree. In 1996, in return for flexibility and wage increase concessions,
employers promised that there would be no further reduction of total
employment in the chemical industry, which sank from 593,800 in 1991 to
509,400 in 1995 (Handelsblatt 1996: 1), during the duration of the collective
bargaining agreement. This was one of the first alliances for work at the
industry level in Germany.2 It is perhaps worth emphasizing at this point
that, despite the flexibility concessions of the trade unions, centralized
collective bargaining still constrains employers significantly in regard to pay
and other terms and conditions (Muller 1996).
Second, a high and growing exempt ratio is another factor that may
contribute to the relative stability of the central bargaining system in the two
sectors studied. All those employees who earn significantly more than the
highest base salary prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement are
exempt (Außertarifliche Angestellte). (In 1996 in both industries this
threshold was about 85,000 DM per year.) Over the last decade the
proportion of those exempt has grown by more than a quarter in both
industries; by 1994, 13.3 per cent of chemical employees and 19.1 per cent of
employees in commercial banks were exempts (Bundesarbeitgeberverband
Chemie 1995: 16–17; Arbeitgeberverband des privaten Bankgewerbes 1995;
own calculations). As this group is outside the scope of the central
remuneration agreement, employers have more autonomy in exempt pay
(Muller 1997). Trade unions in both industries have demanded the
introduction in the collective bargaining agreement of wage classes that are
above the highest job grades negotiated to date, but employers have not
conceded to these demands yet (Arbeitgeberverband des privaten Bank-
gewerbes 1994: 12; Fo¨rster and Hausmann 1993: 788).
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In conclusion, it seems that, in both the chemical industry and the banking
sector, most employers still comply with the system of central collective
bargaining. The example of some US firms in the sample shows that, at least
for small and medium-sized firms, it is possible to avoid collective
bargaining. However, they do not seem to provide a model for other firms in
these industries. Nevertheless, although centralized collective bargaining
coverage is still high, this labour market institution has become somewhat
weaker. There has been a decentralization of employment regulation from
industry bargaining to company or establishment level bargaining and more
employees are no longer directly covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments. This development is not necessarily negative. It can be interpreted as
the development of a more articulated bargaining system (Adams 1995: 76)
or ‘a new synthesis between pressures for coordination and those for
decentralisation’ (Crouch 1996: 358).
3. Workplace representation
With regard to multi-employer bargaining, German employers usually have
a choice of joining an employers’ association or not. In this respect it differs
from workplace representation. The Works Constitution Act specifies that
works councils can be elected in all establishments with at least five
employees. In contrast to the United States, where a majority of employees
have to vote for union recognition, Germany needs only a small number of
determined employees to initiate the installation of a works council.
It is estimated that more than 70 per cent of German employees are
represented by works councils and a further 15 per cent by a comparable
institution in the public sector (Niedenhoff 1989). These bodies have co-
determination rights regarding, for example the ‘commencement and
termination of the daily working hours’ and the ‘fixing of job and bonus rates
and comparable performance-related remuneration’ (Works Constitution
Act, Section 87). When co-determination rights apply, management has to
get the approval of works councils before it can implement any change.
(For a more detailed description of the German system of workplace repre-
sentation see Baethge and Wolf 1995; Mu¨ller-Jentsch 1995; Visser and
Ruysseveldt 1996.) Compared with similar bodies in other European
countries, German works councils have a fairly sizeable influence on organ-
izational decisions (Gill 1993; IDE 1993).
Four of the firms in the sample—US Merchant Bank, US Investment
Bank, US Commercial Bank and US Pharmaceutical—do not have a works
council. US Chemical and US International do not have works councils in all
their major establishments. When the human resource managers of these
firms were asked why they did not have works councils in all or some of their
establishments, they claimed that their employees had not felt the need to
establish such a body. Two of the managers suggested that the non-existence
of a works council has advantages. The human resource manager of US
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International Bank, who has to deal with a works council in one of the bank’s
five establishments, said that he has to spend a lot of time and energy dealing
with this council. According to US Investment Bank’s human resource
manager, a works council would delay organizational change; this would
create tensions, as rapid decision-making is a pivotal element of the bank’s
American culture. However, medium and large-sized firms can hardly
follow a non-works-council strategy. More than 90 per cent of all private-
sector firms in Germany with more 200 employees have a works council
(Mendius and Semlinger 1991). According to our information, US Mer-
chant Bank, which has 300 employees in Germany, is the biggest foreign-
owned bank with no works council. Hence, as long as there are no legal
changes, there will be no convergence to US employment practices in this
area.
At present no major legal changes to the German system of workplace
representation are being discussed. Nevertheless, if there were a strong
feeling by employers against it, and if it could be shown that this labour
market institution severely disrupts the smooth running of operations, the
system would come under pressure. Therefore, it is interesting to mention
that, although some managers in the sample firms complained about works
councils delaying or preventing change, most interviewees, managers and
works councillors alike, described the industrial relations climate in their
company as one of high trust. These claims were supported by complemen-
tary evidence. For example, the conciliation committee (Einigungsstelle),
the last resort that employee representatives have in disputes with manage-
ment, is hardly used in the sample firms. In company publications such as
annual reports, statements were frequently found of management
acknowledging that it co-operates with employee representatives. The 1995
annual report of Big Bank, for example, stated: ‘We also thank the works
councillors and their bodies . . . for the trustful co-operation and the
willingness to work constructively at the solution of problems’ (translation
by the author).
We frequently came across examples of employee representatives de-
manding changes on issues where they had co-determination rights. For
example, in one firm they secured better terms and conditions for the staff of
a canteen when subcontracting was introduced; in another firm, the central
works council agreed to the introduction of an assessment centre for
management development purposes, but prevented management from
using it as a selection device. Usually, works councils did not entirely block
initiatives of change by management. Often they were even prepared to give
up some of their rights. This impression is supported by the 1987 Industrial
Democracy in Europe (IDE 1993) study. In-depth interviews in selected
firms found that the actual influence of German works councils was
significantly lower than their legally prescribed involvement in organiza-
tional decisions. In contrast, in five of the eleven other surveyed countries,
the actual influence of representative bodies at the establishment level was
higher than their de jure participation.
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Concerning the future of workplace representation in Germany, the
transfer of bargaining functions from the industry level to works councils has
already strengthened and will further strengthen the position of works
councils. When weekly working hours in the chemical industry, for example,
were reduced from 39 to 37.5 hours in 1992, it was left to local management
and works councils to negotiate how work should be reorganized to meet
this target. Therefore, during the visits to chemical firms in the second half of
1992 human resource managers were busy working out schemes most
appropriate for their establishment and negotiating them with their
employee representatives. As a result of collective bargaining decentraliza-
tion, the position of German works councils is today much stronger than in
the past (Mu¨ller-Jentsch 1995). Nevertheless, there is an expectation that
new forms of work organization could lead to new forms of direct
participation which could supplement or even replace interest representa-
tion by the works council (Mu¨ller-Jentsch and Sperling 1995; Wa¨chter 1992;
Wever 1995).
All in all, there is a stronger compliance with the requirements of
workplace representation than with industry-wide collective bargaining.
This is not surprising, as legal requirements make it almost impossible, at
least for medium and large-sized firms, to avoid this labour market
institution. Hence, in the absence of legal changes, a convergence to
unitarist industrial relations practices is unlikely to occur in this area.
4. Initial vocational training
Each year several hundred thousand young people enter training schemes in
the areas of administration, service, craft and manufacturing for a period of
usually three years. (For descriptions of the German system of initial
vocational training see Cantor 1989; Ge´hin and Me´haut 1995; Steedman
1993.) At the end of 1995, 1,579,750 young people in East and West
Germany were taking part in such initial vocational training (Bundes-
ministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft 1996: 171). Two-thirds of the firms in the sample
comply with the requirements of initial vocational training; at the end of
1992 their apprentice ratio was at least 3 per cent and therefore significant.
One-quarter of the sample firms partly complies, since they employ
apprentices albeit less than 3 per cent. It is worth noting that, whereas
almost all German-owned firms comply, a majority of the foreign-owned
firms comply only partly. Three foreign-owned firms—US International
Bank, US Investment Bank and US Commercial Bank—have no appren-
tices at all. Why do they not comply?
Employment size can hardly be a reason, as survey evidence shows that
more than 80 per cent of banks operating in Germany in this size group have
apprentices (Mendius and Semlinger 1991). From the interviews conducted
in these banks, three reasons emerged. First, in contrast to the other
companies surveyed, US International Bank, US Investment Bank and US
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Commercial Bank put a high emphasis on numerical flexibility. This means
that it would be more difficult for them to recoup the money invested on
initial vocational training; thus, it is cheaper for them to poach young
employees with vocational training from indigenous banks and, if necessary,
provide them with a job specific training. Second, these banks have
difficulties meeting the requirements in the training regulations for the
occupation ‘bank clerk’ (Bankkaufmann). These regulations make it
compulsory that apprentices have on-the-job training in areas such as
securities, savings accounts and mortgages. Only universal banks which are
common in Germany can easily offer such comprehensive training. As the
three non-vocational training banks specialize in certain types of business
only, they are not able to train apprentices in all types of task demanded by
the training regulations. Third, a further reason may well be headquarters’
influence. In some of the foreign-owned firms that train apprentices,
managers reported that lengthy discussions with their parent company were
necessary before they were allowed to employ apprentices. This could
explain why, compared with the German-owned sample, foreign-owned
subsidiaries in general comply less with the requirements of initial voca-
tional training.
In contrast to the three US banks, all other sample firms have apprentices.
One reason for this is a demand for the qualification provided by this
training. In the absence of more detailed company data, data from both
industries indicate that this demand has increased in recent decades.
Between 1962 and 1987, the percentage of blue-collar workers in the
chemical industry who had an initial vocational training qualification in the
occupation they were working in increased from 25 to 39 per cent. For
white-collar workers it rose similarly from 22 to 37 per cent (Veba 1988: 14).
Thus, even for jobs that were traditionally occupied by unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, a vocational training qualification has become an entrance
requirement (Ku¨hnlein and Kohlhoff 1991: 123). In savings banks, which
employ about one-third of all German bank employees, the percentage of
employees with an initial vocational training qualification increased from
about 70 per cent in 1970 to about 90 per cent in 1994 (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband 1995: 73). However, some banking experts
are suggesting that changing business strategies will lead to a less qualified
work-force in banks (D’Alessio and Oberbeck 1997; Sperling 1996). In some
of the sample firms, we observed trends that support this assessment.
Savings Bank was planning to recruit externally counter staff who have no
initial vocational training qualification in order to save costs. Regional Bank
has founded an independent subsidiary in East Germany that provides only
a few banking services and for which sales skills were a more important
recruitment criterion than a vocational training qualification.
The Future of the System of Initial Vocational Training
Although apprentice ratios in Germany are still high by international
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standards (Gospel 1994: 512), they have declined significantly over the last
decade. In many of the sample firms the apprentice ratio, i.e. the number of
apprentices as a percentage of the total work-force, fell by more than a
quarter. Between 1985 and 1995 the apprentice ratio in the chemical
industry fell from 5.5 to 3.9 per cent and in commercial banks from 9.0 to 6.3
per cent (Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie 1995, 1996; Arbeitgeber-
verband des privaten Bankgewerbes 1986, 1996). A similar decline can be
observed in West German industry, where the ratio sank from 6.9 per cent in
1985 to 4.5 per cent in 1995 (Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft 1996: 12,
171; own calculations). Even if one takes into account the fact that the mid-
1980s were exceptional, since considerable public pressure was exerted on
firms in Germany to commit additional resources to initial vocational
training in order to reduce youth unemployment, the German system of
initial vocational training seems to be in deep crisis. However, this
assessment may be too pessimistic.
With the exception of two managers in US subsidiaries, none of the
managers interviewed questioned the viability of the initial vocational
training system. This observation is supported by a more representative
1993 survey of 300 large firms: 95 per cent of the respondents claimed that
initial vocational training is and will remain an irreplaceable and indispens-
able part of their company’s human resource policy (Bundesministerium fu¨r
Bildung und Wissenschaft 1995: 46–7). Furthermore, since the mid-1990s
there has been renewed political pressure on companies operating in
Germany to take on apprentices. As in the 1980s, the German government,
employers’ organizations, trade unions and the media are trying to persuade
companies to increase their initial vocational training efforts and thus to
alleviate the acute shortage of training placements in eastern Germany and
some parts of western Germany. The main threat used to persuade
employers is to impose a training levy on those firms that do not offer enough
initial vocational training (Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung and Wissen-
schaft 1994: 25). This pressure has already had some success. In several
industries, among them banking and chemicals, employers have committed
themselves in collective bargaining negotiations to offer more initial
vocational training (European Industrial Relations Review 1997). Whereas
the number of young people starting an initial vocational training fell
constantly in the early 1990s, it increased from 566,000 in 1994 to 573,000 in
1995 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996a: 13). In the chemical industry,
an increase of 13 per cent was achieved (Handelsblatt 1996: 1).
Nevertheless, a serious threat to the German system of initial vocational
training is a long-term increase in graduate employment (Wa¨chter 1992:
335).3 In the chemical industry, the percentage of employees with a
university degree increased from 4.3 per cent in 1982 to 7.0 per cent in 1994
(Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie 1995: 16–17). Graduate employment
in banks has increased even more; for example, the graduate ratio of
Regional Bank increased from 6.2 per cent in 1985 to 16.1 per cent in 1995.
The employers’ association of private banks estimates that over the last
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25 years the ratio between the recruitment of apprentices and the
recruitment of graduates changed from 40:1 to 8:1. Whereas in the
past graduates were usually recruited only as junior managers, today they
can also be found in non-managerial positions (Arbeitgeberverband des
privaten Bankgewerbes 1995: 28). Hence it appears that the increase in the
availability of other forms of education and training may have an effect on
apprenticeship uptake.
All in all, the majority of sample firms still comply with the requirements
of initial vocational training. The renewed public pressure on companies to
improve their initial vocational training record suggests that there is still a
widely shared consensus in Germany about the benefits of this system.
Therefore it seems that, at least in the short term, the system of initial
vocational training does not seem to be threatened. Nevertheless, the
growth in graduate employment could threaten the long-term viability of
initial vocational training in Germany at least to some extent.
5. Summary
This paper set out to determine whether banks and chemical firms in
Germany still comply with the requirements of the three key labour market
institutions of centralized collective bargaining, workplace representation
and initial vocational training. The empirical analysis revealed that not all
firms do so. Although the German institutional environment is relatively
strong, the example of some of the sample firms shows that it leaves at least
some room for manoeuvre. The biggest challenge to the German system
appears to come from the US-owned firms in the sample. More important
than the deviant behaviour of some of the firms, however, is the fact that the
majority of companies in the sample still do largely comply with the
requirements of collective bargaining, workplace representation and initial
vocational training. Of those firms that do not comply, most have not done
so for a long time.
The analysis of the future of centralized collective bargaining, workplace
representation and initial vocational training in the banking and chemical
industries in Germany indicates that the regulatory influence of initial
vocational training and multi-employer bargaining has become somewhat
weaker. Nevertheless, none of these institutions seems to be seriously
threatened in the near future. Despite the current debate about the viability
of collective bargaining in eastern Germany and the metal industry, other
German experts have also pointed to the stability of the German system (cf.
Inagami 1996; Mu¨ller-Jentsch and Sperling 1995; Sadowski et al. 1995;
Streeck 1996). This stability is surprising, considering the growing competi-
tive pressures on German companies and the radical changes that similar
institutions have gone through in other countries. A reason for this
institutional resilience is that the institutional framework has so far been
flexible enough to accommodate new pressures. Until now changes have
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largely been within the system. Only if the competitiveness of German
industry significantly decreases may a radical convergence towards US
employment practices or some other system or hybrid be expected.
In sum, it appears that there has been no transformation of the German
system of industrial relations. Although there has been some decentraliza-
tion of collective bargaining issues, a non-union sector has not emerged so
far. Organizational autonomy is still significantly restricted by German
labour market institutions. Germany has not gone down the route of other
countries such as the UK and the USA, where there has been a shift from
pluralist towards more unitarist employment practices. Hence the case of
Germany does not support a convergence thesis, and instead points to the
existence of different systems of labour management.
Final version accepted 10 June 1997.
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Notes
1. For quite some time, the employers’ association of private banks has been
offering a guest membership. Guest members such as US Commercial Bank are
not bound by the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the association,
but do not have access to the full service of the association. The employers’
association of the chemical industry offers no guest membership at all.
2. In the meantime, other industries have followed the path towards regulated
decentralization of collective bargaining (European Industrial Relations Review
1996). In order to prevent the demise of multi-employer bargaining, the leader of
the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), Schulte, has recently demanded an
even more radical and widespread opening of collective bargaining for firm-
specific solutions (Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung 1997: 2).
3. Many German graduates, particularly those with a business administration
degree, have done initial vocational training prior to university. Nevertheless,
it is unusual for people with a university degree to be accepted as apprentices.
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